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Introduction
Residential housing is not a liquid asset, as anyone who has ever tried to sell a house can
attest. Because housing is illiquid, homesellers often employ real estate brokers to assist
with a sale. This paper assesses the impacts of brokers, brokerage ﬁrms and price-related
marketing strategies on housing liquidity.
The degree of housing market illiquidity is most often measured by time on the market
(TOM). A number of studies have examined the determinants of TOM. Belkin, Hempel
and McLeavey (1976) demonstrate that TOM is a positive function of the difference
between listing price and selling price. Miller (1978) reports a positive relationship
between list price and TOM. Additional studies by Janssen and Jobson (1980), Kang and
Gardner (1989), and Asabere, Huffman and Mehdian (1993) have conﬁrmed that listing
price and above-market pricing affect TOM. These studies, however, use regression
analysis instead of the more appropriate duration model approach.
Kalra and Chan (1994), Yang and Yavas ¸ (1995a), and Haurin (1988) report that TOM
is inﬂuenced by local and national economic conditions and is subject to strong seasonal
effects. Haurin (1988), drawing on search theory developed by Feinberg and Johnson
(1977), shows that TOM is positively related to the atypicality of a house, that is, more
unusual houses require more time to market.
Haurin also reports that larger brokerage ﬁrms sell homes more rapidly than smaller
ones. The effect of brokerage ﬁrm size on TOM is conﬁrmed by Larsen and Park (1989)
and Sirmans, Turnbull and Benjamin (1991); however, Yang and Yavas ¸ (1995a) report
that the size of the selling ﬁrm has no effect. In a separate study, Yang and Yavas ¸ (1995b)
ﬁnd that homes listed and sold by the same brokerage ﬁrm do not sell more rapidly than
others. Their ﬁndings do not support the suspicions of some researchers (see Carney,
1982, and Frew, 1987) that listing brokers may systematically delay submitting properties
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Abstract. This paper examines the impact of brokers, brokerage ﬁrms and marketing
strategy on time on the market (TOM) in the residential housing market. Using a duration
model methodology, the study ﬁnds duration dependence to be positive, suggesting that the
probability of sale increases with TOM. Pricing-related marketing strategies are found to
strongly inﬂuence TOM, but individual agent and ﬁrm characteristics are not statistically
signiﬁcant. These results are consistent with an efﬁcient market within a multiple listing
service—no group of agents or ﬁrms appears to possess special advantages enabling them
to sell homes more quickly than their rivals.to their multiple listing service (MLS) that they expect to sell quickly and at low cost.
Sirmans, Turnbull and Benjamin (1991) also ﬁnd no support for this proposition. Yang
and Yavas ¸ (1995b) report further that commission rates of selling agents do not
signiﬁcantly impact TOM; however, increases in the number of listings (sales) of the
listing agent increases (decreases) TOM.
Most brokers try to represent themselves as having special abilities and knowledge that
enable them to sell a home more quickly and at a higher price than their rivals. When
choosing a real estate agent to sell a home, sellers often are encouraged by broker
advertising to select the agent who touts selling a home at a higher price in a shorter
period of time. The question in which we are interested is whether the seller’s choice of a
real estate agent affects housing liquidity, or TOM. From the seller’s perspective, the issue
is whether there are savings in marketing time to listing with some agents or ﬁrms in
preference to others. Section two of the paper formulates an analytical model to assess
agent performance. Sections three and four present the methodology and sample data,
respectively. Section ﬁve sets forth empirical estimates of the model, and the ﬁnal section
summarizes ﬁndings and discusses the implications of the study.
Real Estate Brokers and Housing Liquidity
Assume that all houses are sold within an MLS. The market price (P) of the average
home is given by:
P5a01a1*TOM1H*X1A*Z1 up , (1)
where  TOM is time on the market, X is a vector of housing and neighborhood
characteristics, and Z is a vector of factors that affect both price and TOM, such as, the
degree of overpricing, atypicality, market conditions, and seasonality, and ﬁrm and
broker characteristics.
We deﬁne a home’s ‘‘expected’’ market value (P ˆ) to be the value predicted by a hedonic
equation, which is estimated by the regression of selling price (P) on the vector X:
P ˆ5H*X . (2)
Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) gives the following:
PE5b01b1*TOM1B*Z1ep , (3)
where, PE5P2P ˆ, or ‘‘excess’’ price.
It is expected that b1$0. Increasing TOM is anticipated to raise the probability of
ﬁnding a buyer willing to pay a higher price.1
Likewise, TOM is given by:
TOM5c01c1*PE1C*Z1ut. (4)
It is expected that c1$0.
The reduced form equation of this simultaneous system is found by substituting
equation (3) into equation (4), yielding the following:
TOM5 (c01c1b0)/(12c1b1)1[(c1B1C)/(12c1b1)]*Z1et . (5)
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TOM5d01D*Z1et . (6)
A number of factors included in the vector Z have been identiﬁed in previous research.
These include the degree of above-market pricing, atypicality, market conditions, and
seasonality. Our study introduces characteristics of the listing and selling brokerage ﬁrms
and the listing and selling agents.
The null hypothesis of the study is that there are no signiﬁcant differences among ﬁrms
or agents in the time required to sell brokered homes.2 The basic question of the study,
therefore, may be formulated as: Are there marketing time savings attributable to the
productivity of brokerage ﬁrms or agents?
Methodology
In this study, the dependent variable is a home’s time until sale or time on the market
(TOM). Many empirical TOM studies have relied on log-linear regression models (Belkin
et al., 1976; Miller, 1978; Sirmans et al., 1991). Although it is sometimes possible to use
a regression log-linear regression approach, Kiefer (1988) details the numerous
transformations of the OLS model required to correct for OLS deﬁciencies. For example,
test statistics will be incorrect because of non-normality of the error term. In addition,
because the mean of the error term is non-zero, the intercept estimate must be adjusted.
Censoring of data can be accommodated using Tobit-like methods; however, the
estimation problem becomes nonlinear in nature.
Duration models have been used more recently in TOM research (Zuehlke, 1987; Yang
and Yavas ¸, 1995b). The survival function originates from the distribution function F(t),




The hazard function, which is related to the survival function, is the rate at which home
sales are completed after duration t given that they last at least until time t. Given the
probability density function f(t) corresponding to F (t), the hazard function is speciﬁed as
follows:
l(t)5f(t)/S(t) . (8)
The choice of duration model depends on the choice of hazard function. In analyses
where the hazard rate does not vary over time, i.e., the probability of a sale is the same
regardless of when the observation is made, the exponential distribution provides simple
and accurate parameter estimates. However, prior studies of TOM indicate the hazard
rate is not constant (Zuehlke, 1987; Yang and Yavas ¸, 1995b). Yang and Yavas ¸ (1995b)
detect negative duration dependence using a Weibull duration model, which corresponds
to less chance of a home sale as time progresses.4 The Weibull hazard function is ﬂexible,
as it assumes a monotonically increasing or decreasing function.5 The Weibull hazard
function is:
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where g5exp (Xb), a is the duration dependence parameter, and X is the vector of
regression variables. The exponential hazard function is a special case of the Weibull
model occurring when a51.
Heterogeneity occurs if individual observations in a population have different
distributions. Although explanatory variables are included in the duration model to
control for heterogeneity, they may not provide a complete speciﬁcation or not be
observable variables. In this case, individual observations have differing duration
distributions, which renders misleading inferences about duration dependence and
included explanatory variables (Kiefer, 1988). In general, heterogeneity leads to a
downward bias in duration dependence. Greene (1993) notes that the gamma Weibull
model offers corrections for problems associated with heterogeneity of the survival
distribution. Using the Weibull duration model with correction for heterogeneity,
Zuehlke ﬁnds vacant houses exhibit positive duration dependence, suggesting it is more
likely that the duration will end as time progresses.
Using the Weibull hazard function, with LTOMi as the natural logarithm of time on












i 5the degree of above-market pricing, as measured by the difference between
the natural logarithm of the list price and the natural logarithm of the
predicted price from a hedonic price equation;6
DPL
i 5the natural logarithm of the original list price minus the natural logarithm
of the ﬁnal list price;
ANSL
i 5the natural logarithm of the total number of home sales for the agent listing
home i;
ANSS
i 5the natural logarithm of the total number of home sales for the agent selling
home i;
ONSL
i 5the natural logarithm of the total number of home sales for the ofﬁce listing
home i;
ONSS
i 5the natural logarithm of the total number of home sales for the ofﬁce selling
home i;
FRSL
i 5a dummy variable for franchise afﬁliation of the ofﬁce listing home i;
Ii 5a dummy variable for identical listing and selling ofﬁces for home sale i;
ATYi 5the degree of atypicality of home i (see Haurin, 1988);
ECOi 5a vector of variables to capture regional economic and seasonal effects when
selling home i including the unemployment rate (URATE), the mortgage
interest rate (MRATE), and a dummy variable for the summer months
(SUMM).
Including the degree of above-market pricing (PA
i) and change in listing price (DPL
i)
variables in equation (7) provides a test of the marketing strategy employed by the listing
agent and the homeseller. A number of prior studies have conﬁrmed the importance of
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i. In these studies, above-market pricing contributes to longer TOM (Asabere et al.,
1993). However, repricing signals also may affect the home’s time on the market. When
changing the list price of a home, a new signal may be sent to market participants about
the seller’s threshold price. If a seller’s threshold price is reduced, the home’s time on the
market should be reduced. The relisting effect (DPL
i) is measured as the difference
between the log of the original list price and the log of the ﬁnal list price, or the
percentage change in the list price.
Other independent variables in the model capture the effects of agent and ﬁrm charac-
teristics and expertise. Listing and selling agents may possess special advantages because of
numerous factors such as work experience, training and other resources.7 Although these
factors contribute to agent productivity, the many and varied nature of these variables
makes measurement difﬁcult. We focus on the outcome of these measures which is the
number of sales consummated for the listing (ANSL
i) and selling agents (ANSS
i).8 Conven-
tional wisdom suggests that listing agents who have sold many homes help the seller sell
quickly. From the selling agent’s perspective, a successful selling agent may be one who
spots what the buyer wants and persuades the buyer to pay the seller’s price. Therefore, an
experienced selling agent offering guidance to the buyer might result in faster sales.9
Variables representing the number of sales for the selling and listing ofﬁces capture
differences in organizational efﬁciencies such as reputation and ﬁrm-speciﬁc advertising
or selling techniques that may enable the selling or listing ﬁrm to market the home more
rapidly. The existence of statistically signiﬁcant parameters for listing (ONSL
i) and selling
(ONSS
i) ﬁrms supports the argument that some ﬁrms have special abilities and knowledge
that give them a marketing edge. A separate dummy variable for franchise ofﬁces (FRSL
i)
is included in the model to determine if franchise ﬁrms sell homes more quickly than
non-franchise ﬁrms. One possible explanation is that franchise ﬁrms have better
informational access and greater advertising than non-franchise ﬁrms.
Another issue is the question of whether having the identical listing and selling ﬁrm
involved in a transaction creates a marketing time advantage.10 An independent variable
(I) captures whether or not the listing and selling ﬁrm are the same for a home sale
transaction (I51 if same, 0 otherwise).
Sample Data
The model is tested using data from the Greensboro Regional REALTORS Association
(Greensboro, North Carolina) for the period starting September 1991 and ending in
September 1993. A total of 4,183 housing transactions formed the initial dataset;
however, missing data and incorrect codings reduced the size of the sample. The ﬁnal
dataset consists of 2,285 sales. The homes in the sample represent sales by 111 different
brokerage ﬁrms involving more than 600 individual real estate agents.
Exhibit 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in the model. Applying the
antilogarithm to the maximum number of sales, the listing agent and selling agent
maximum values are 39 and 72, respectively. The minimum is one home sale for listing
and selling agents.
The mean time on the market is approximately 108 days, suggesting that the average
home is sold in a little more than three months. The rather large standard deviation and
maximum TOM of 985 days indicates, however, that the mean is not likely indicative of
the actual TOM for a particular home.
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The survival function shown in Exhibit 2 illustrates that 50% of homes are sold within
178 days (about six months) and near 100% of homes are sold in sixteen months. The
shape of the survival function resembles the exponential and Weibull distributions. As
Exhibit 3 indicates, the likelihood that a home will sell increases with time until
approximately 197 days, reaches a plateau, and then declines at a decreasing rate. This
suggests that homesellers initially enjoy increasing prospects for a home sale. However,
after some period of time on the market, unsold homes become more difﬁcult to sell. One
might interpret these results as increasing visibility and recognition for new home listings,
followed by a gradual ‘‘stigma’’ attached to unsold homes.
Exhibit 4 presents the hazard model parameter estimates. The Weibull distribu-
tion offers a considerably lower log likelihood than OLS. In addition, the value of
a51/s51.0576, suggests very slight positive duration dependence. A 95% conﬁdence
interval, 1.0257[a[1.0896 indicates that Weibull may be preferred to the exponential
model.
Duration models are based on the homogeneity of the survival distribution across
homes in the sample. If the survival distribution is heterogeneous, parameter estimates
will be inconsistent and/or inferences will be based on incorrect standard errors
(Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon, 1984). As q deviates from 0, the greater the effect of
heterogeneity. The statistical signiﬁcance of theta (q) from zero for the Weibull model
(column 4 in Exhibit 4) indicates the presence of heterogeneity, and requires
incorporating heterogeneity into the survival function as shown in the parameter
estimates reported in the last column of Exhibit 4. Therefore, our analysis will focus on
the Weibull (q heterogeneity) model.
The Weibull model result, incorporating heterogeneity, shows that pricing strategies
matter. The statistical signiﬁcance of the above-market pricing variable (PA
i) suggests that
overpricing lengthens a home’s time on the market. Conversely, a change in the list price
(DPL
i) has the effect of reducing TOM.
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Exhibit 1 
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev. Minimum Maximum
TOMi 108.0455 109.6955 1.0000 985.0000
LTOMi 4.1136 1.2565 0.0000 6.8926
PA
i 0.1882 0.1701 0.0000 1.7220
DPL
i 20.0185 0.0431 20.4840 0.1478
ANSL
i 2.2093 0.8463 0.0000 3.6636
ANSS
i 2.4247 0.8249 0.0000 4.2767
ONSL
i 4.7195 1.5241 0.0000 6.2186
ONSS
i 5.2215 1.5319 0.0000 6.5917
FRSL
i 0.4219 0.4940 0.0000 1.0000
Ii 0.3348 0.4720 0.0000 1.0000
ATYi 20.1280 0.1690 21.4220 1.7613
URATEi 4.8800 0.3882 3.9000 5.4000
MRATEi 8.2296 0.6120 7.0400 10.0400
SUMMi 0.2788 0.4485 0.0000 1.0000BEST PAPER, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE/AGENCY 453
Exhibit 2
Survival Function
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eIt is interesting to note that neither characteristics of the listing or selling agent had a
statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on TOM. That is, the number of sales of the listing and
selling agents did not have a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on TOM. Similarly, the
number of sales listing and selling agent ofﬁces had an imperceptible statistical effect on
TOM, as did whether or not the ﬁrm belonged to a franchise. Likewise, TOM does not
appear to be reduced if a home is listed and sold by the same brokerage ofﬁce.
To further examine the impact of the brokerage-related variables, we conducted a joint






i) in the model. Applying a likelihood ratio test to the Weibull model with q
heterogeneity (column 4 in Exhibit 4) we calculate a chi-square value (with 5 degrees of
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Exhibit 4
Hazard Model Parameter Estimates
Exponential Weibull
Variable OLS Weibull (q Het.) (q Het.)
Constant 4.6023 4.8552 4.8269 4.7437
(11.998) (16.074) (13.911) (14.612)
PA
i 1.6999 3.0013 2.9685 2.8421
(4.621) (9.803) (8.897) (9.617)
DPL
i 27.8872 23.4360 23.7845 25.0295
(211.228) (27.201) (25.963) (28.126)
ANSL
i 0.0020 0.0487 0.0473 0.0439
(0.061) (1.879) (1.588) (1.527)
ANSS
i 20.0401 20.0520 20.0501 20.0442
(21.286) (21.969) (21.676) (21.604)
ONSL
i 20.0090 20.0184 20.0196 20.0240
(20.445) (21.137) (21.052) (21.384)
ONSS
i 20.0059 0.0043 0.0025 20.0038
(20.336) (0.286) (0.146) (20.245)
FRSL
i 20.0667 0.0123 0.0069 20.0098
(21.263) (0.315) (0.153) (20.219)
Ii 20.1588 20.0255 20.0283 20.0291
(22.997) (20.621) (20.603) (20.656)
ATYi 1.6296 2.8685 2.8304 2.6724
(4.377) (9.180) (8.282) (8.869)
URATEi 0.2468 0.0900 0.0960 0.1050
(2.552) (1.051) (0.987) (1.164)
MRATEi 20.2052 20.0977 20.1004 20.1001
(23.169) (21.638) (21.495) (21.654)
SUMMi 20.0498 20.0605 20.0613 20.0666
(20.835) (21.303) (21.142) (21.303)
q – – 0.0099 0.1619
– – (0.555) (4.642)
s – 0.9455 1.0000 0.8517
– (64.842) – (40.082)
a – 1.0576 1.0000 1.1741
N 2285 2285 2285 2285
Log-L 23608 23449 23455 23436
Adj. R2 0.1230 – – –freedom) of 6.99, which has a probability value of 0.221. Accordingly, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the brokerage and agent parameter characteristics vector is zero.
Although the ﬁndings of nonsigniﬁcance of many broker and brokerage ﬁrm
characteristics are consistent with those of Yang and Yavas ¸ (1995a), they did ﬁnd that
listing the property with a successful listing agent corresponds to decreases in TOM. Our
study ﬁnds that listing property with a successful agent does not reduce a home’s TOM.
In general, the nonsigniﬁcance of broker and brokerage ﬁrm characteristics is
consistent with the notion of an efﬁcient market for home selling. Although successful
agents do facilitate the housing market as a whole, the dissemination of information
through the multiple listing service creates an efﬁcient market to bring buyers and sellers
together for particular home purchases or sales.11
As expected, home atypicality is positively related to TOM; homes that are more
atypical take longer to sell. This variable has been tested in prior research by Haurin
(1988).
Conclusions and Implications
This paper explores the effect of brokerage ﬁrm and agent characteristics on the time it
takes to market a home. The study ﬁnds no evidence that particular agents or ﬁrms are
able to market a home faster than others. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea of
efﬁcient information ﬂow in the MLS market, where agents and ﬁrms do not possess
special advantages since information within the MLS is shared. Information advantages
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Exhibit 5
Integrated Hazard Function
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edo not appear to be internally generated either, as we ﬁnd no evidence that TOM is
affected when the listing and selling agents are in the same real estate ﬁrm. These results
accord with past work reported by Jud and Winkler (1994) showing that there are no
differences among brokers in the prices paid for homes in an MLS.
The results indicate that the list price, changes in the list price, and home atypicality are
very important determinants of TOM. Higher list prices are associated with higher
TOM, and reducing the listed price decreases TOM. Home atypicality is directly related
to TOM, with more atypical homes having longer average TOM.
Notes
1Miller (1978) shows that selling price and TOM are positively related.
2In terms of the structural equations, a ﬁnding that D50 is consistent with either B5C50 or
C52c1B. In the ﬁrst instance, agents and ﬁrms have no special inﬂuence on price (B50) and TOM
(C50). In the second case, the lower TOM resulting from a shift in equation (4) is offset by the
higher price caused by a shift in equation (3). In this second case, the implication is that while some
agents or ﬁrms produce a higher price, there is no inﬂuence on TOM. Because our model is not able
to identify the structural equations, we cannot distinguish the two alternatives. Thus, our results
test only TOM effects. Nevertheless, TOM effects are important. And a recent study of price effects
by Jud and Winkler (1994) ﬁnds no consistent price effects related to agents and ﬁrms, which
suggests that the second case is not a relevant alternative.
3Bandopadhyaya (1994) provides a very clear explanation of duration models within the context of
the time that ﬁrms spend in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
4As new buyers continually enter the pool of homebuyers where homes prices and characteristics
are disseminated through the MLS database, it seems reasonable to expect duration to be constant
or perhaps slightly positive as agents should be more aware of older listings and therefore, steer
potential homebuyers to older listings. On the other hand, if old listings have a ‘‘stigma’’ attached
to them, this might explain the ﬁnding of negative duration dependence.
5In addition to the Weibull hazard function, hazards for log-normal and log-logistic distributions
ﬁrst increase and then decrease. Researchers often compute the log likelihood function and plot the
survival, hazard, and integrated hazard functions to determine the most appropriate duration
model.
6The hedonic price equation used in this study is the same as that reported in the appendix to Jud
and Winkler (1994).
7For analysis of the determinants of REALTOR productivity and earnings, see Crellin, Frew and
Jud (1988) and Glower and Hendershott (1988).
8Given the number of agents in the study, the use of dummy variables for individual agents is not
feasible. The number of dummy variables is too large, and collinearity with the structural variables
for the ﬁrm exists.
9One might suspect the possibility of a selectivity bias in the analysis because buyers and sellers are
not randomly assigned to real estate ﬁrms, but actively pick their brokers. If brokers are chosen by
buyers and sellers, then TOM differentials could potentially result from the differences among
buyers and sellers, not from differences in broker productivity. Were this to be the case, one would
expect to ﬁnd that house prices vary among different groups of homebuyers. This question has 
been examined recently by Turnbull and Sirmans (1993). Using MLS data from Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, they report no signiﬁcant differences in housing prices across various groups of buyers.
The results of Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) suggest that whatever TOM differentials prevail in the
market, they are not associated with identiﬁable characteristics of homebuyers and sellers.
10For discussion and evidence of the perceptions of consumers and agents involved in this kind of
transaction, see Ball and Nourse (1988). An excellent discussion of the legal issues in this type of
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VOLUME 12, NUMBER 3, 1996relationship can be found in Marsh and Zumpano (1988). In our sample of MLS sales in
Greensboro, North Carolina, the listing and selling ﬁrms were the same in 33% of the transactions.
11An analogous argument occurs in the stock brokerage industry. Individual successful stock
brokers help make the entire market efﬁcient, but they do not get sellers a higher price or sell a
stock sooner.
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